Preparing the Workplace for Transition:  A Solution to Employment Discrimination Based on Gender Identity by Ems, Brittany
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 54 
Number 4 Remaking Law: Moving Beyond 
Enlightenment Jurisprudence (Summer 2010) 
Article 15 
2010 
Preparing the Workplace for Transition: A Solution to Employment 
Discrimination Based on Gender Identity 
Brittany Ems 
emsbm@slu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Brittany Ems, Preparing the Workplace for Transition: A Solution to Employment Discrimination Based on 
Gender Identity, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol54/iss4/15 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1329 
PREPARING THE WORKPLACE FOR TRANSITION:  
A SOLUTION TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
GENDER IDENTITY 
INTRODUCTION 
For over fifty-five years stories about transgenders have appeared in 
newspapers, magazines, and tabloids, captivating an intrigued American 
audience.  Indeed, America’s fascination with stories of sexual transformation 
began with George Jorgensen in 1955.1  George captured the country’s 
attention when he publicly announced his sex reassignment surgery and 
changed his name to Christine.2  Tabloids and newspapers sensationalized 
Jorgensen’s transgenderism with headlines such as, “Bronx GI Becomes a 
Woman!”3 and “Bronx ‘Boy’ Is Now A Girl.”4  But, “rather than withdraw 
from public attention, [Christine] turned the notoriety to her advantage with a 
series of lucrative tours on the lecture and nightclub circuit.”5  Doctor Joanne 
Meyerowitz, a history professor at Indiana University, claims Christine’s 
publicity changed American attitudes toward transgenders.6  “By cultivating 
the demeanor of a lady and by refusing to call herself homosexual,” Christine 
was able to remove some of the stigma associated with transgenderism.7 
Ultimately, Christine Jorgensen’s publicity helped pave the way for other 
transgenders not only to “come out,” but also to gain legal rights in the 
process.8  Dr. Renee Richards, for instance, an eye surgeon, amateur tennis 
player, and male-to-female transgender,9 became famous after “the New York 
County Supreme Court ruled that [she] . . . could play in women’s tennis 
 
 1. John T. McQuiston, Christine Jorgensen, 62, Is Dead; Was First to Have a Sex Change, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1989, at D22. 
 2. Id.  Christine Jorgensen was the first transgender in American history to publicly 
announce her sexual transformation.  Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Dinitia Smith, On Being Male, Female, Neither or Both, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at 
F5 (reviewing CHRISTINE JORGENSEN, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2002)). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Joyce Wadler, The Lady Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at F1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/01/garden/01renee.html. 
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tournaments despite being genetically male.”10  Thomas Beatie, a female-to-
male transgender, became a worldwide media obsession after announcing his 
pregnancy on national television in 2008.11  Thomas also became the center of 
a legal controversy when the state of Oregon refused to recognize him as his 
daughter’s “father” and his wife, as his daughter’s “mother,” on their baby’s 
birth certificate.12  While the transgender community undoubtedly celebrates 
any legal victory, participation in amateur sporting events, and challenges to 
parental titles on birth certificates likely do not affect the majority of the 
estimated 750,000 to 3 million transgender people living in America today.13 
Instead, the National Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE), a national 
social justice organization devoted to transgender issues, lists joblessness, 
homelessness, and hate crimes among the top legal issues that negatively 
impact transgenders’ lives.14  It is not surprising that unemployment ranks high 
on the list considering most jurisdictions do not provide legal protections for 
transgenders against discrimination in the workplace.15  In fact, more than 
thirty states currently lack antidiscrimination legislation for transgenders in the 
employment arena.16  Consequently, employers in those states are permitted to 
discriminatorily fire transgender employees solely because they are 
transgenders.  Unfortunately, the federal government provides little more 
protection. 
Even though Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination “because of . . . sex,”17 circuits are split as to whether Title VII 
protects transgender plaintiffs.18  This is legally significant because Title VII’s 
legislative history fails to address the issue,19 and the Supreme Court has yet to 
tackle it.  This Comment argues that, in light of conflicting case law, Congress 
 
 10. Smith, supra note 6, at F5. 
 11. Pregnant Man Thomas Beatie Is Pregnant Again, OBESITY, FITNESS & WELLNESS 
WEEK, Dec. 6, 2008. 
 12. Joneil Adriano, Pregnant Man, Other Transgender Parents Face Legal Questions, Nov. 
14, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=6246058&page=1. 
 13. Shannon H. Tan, When Steve Is Fired for Becoming Susan: Why Courts and Legislators 
Need to Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37 STETSON L. REV. 579, 582 
(2008) (citing Debra Rosenberg, (Rethinking) Gender, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 2007, at 50, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18630323/site/newsweek). 
 14. National Center for Transgender Equality, available at http://www.nctequality.org/ 
issues.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). 
 15. Id. 
 16. TRANSGENDER L. & POLICY INST., TRANSGENDER ISSUES: A FACT SHEET, http://trans 
genderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (the thirteen states that provide protection are 
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, and Washington, D.C.). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 18. For a discussion on the circuit split, see infra Part III. 
 19. For a discussion on Title VII’s legislative history, see infra Part II. 
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should enact federal legislation to settle the issue.  Specifically, Congress 
should enact a transgender-inclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA).  A transgender-inclusive ENDA would provide transgender plaintiffs 
with standing to sue, the opportunity to have their cases heard on the merits, 
and effective protection from employment discrimination. 
Part I of this Comment will define important terms and explain 
employment issues currently facing transgenders.  Part II will  examine Title 
VII, including congressional intent and standing.  Part III will focus on courts’ 
interpretation of Title VII before and after the quintessential Price Waterhouse 
case.20  Part IV will examine the recent and potentially pivotal decision in 
Schroer v. Billington.21  Part V will discuss the ENDA, Congress’ attempts to 
protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, 
and the Act’s potential effect on employers.  Finally, Part VI will argue that 
Congress must enact a transgender-inclusive ENDA to effectively ban 
employment discrimination based on gender identity and adequately safeguard 
transgenders from discrimination in the workplace. 
I.  TERMINOLOGY AND EMPLOYMENT ISSUES 
A. Terminology 
Title VII bans discrimination “because of . . . sex.”  So, what exactly does 
that mean?  According to Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary, “sex” is the 
“sum of the structural, functional, and behavioral characteristics of living 
things . . . that distinguish males and females.”22  More specifically, biological 
sex is “defined by chromosomes, internal and external genitalia, hormones, and 
gonads.”23  While the term “sex” is often used synonymously with “gender,” 
gender is different and is usually defined as the “behavioral, cultural, or 
psychological traits typically associated with one sex.”24  Because Title VII 
bans employment discrimination “based on sex,” and not gender or sexual 
orientation, many courts interpret Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on 
biological sex only.25  Applying this strictly physical definition leaves no room 
for a mental, psychological, or behavioral analysis, posing potential problems 
for transgender plaintiffs.  While many courts have consistently interpreted 
 
 20. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 21. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 22. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 631 (1995) [hereinafter MEDICAL 
DICTIONARY]. 
 23. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081,1083 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 
1017 (Apr. 15, 1985) (citing T.N. Wise, Transsexualism: A Clinical Approach to Gender 
Dysphoria, 29 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 167, 169 (1982)). 
 24. MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 255. 
 25. Erin E. Goodsell, Toward Real Workplace Equality: Nonsubordination and Title VII 
Sex-Stereotyping Jurisprudence, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 41, 56 (2008). 
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“sex” as a permanent, immutable, biological trait, transgenders argue “sex” 
should be interpreted more broadly, as a mutable characteristic encompassing 
one’s gender identity.26 
Terms such as transgender and transsexual and phrases such as “cross-
gender living” and “gender transition” can sound confusingly similar when 
discussed simultaneously.  This discussion, therefore, first warrants a clear 
definition of these and other important terms.  First, transgender is a broad 
term that applies to a wide range of people who express themselves as the 
opposite sex, including “transsexuals, cross-dressers . . . , intersexed people 
(also known as hermaphrodites), womanish men, [and] mannish 
women . . . .”27  Transgendered people typically “do not conform to societal 
stereotypes of what it means to be ‘male’ or ‘female,’”28 and generally, do not 
choose to be the way they are.29  Instead they “act[] on ‘deep-seated and 
irreversible feelings’” which are “atypical to that of their birth sex.”30  A 
transgendered person’s internal sexual identity, not biological sex, defines 
sexual being.31  Sexual identity gives a transgendered person an “internal . . . 
sense of being male or female, or something or other in between.”32  For 
example, a transgender biological male will internally perceive himself as 
female, and a transgender biological female will internally perceive herself as 
male.33  Believing they are born in the wrong bodies, some transgenders decide 
they would rather undergo sex reassignment surgery than be uncomfortable in 
their own skin.34  Transgenders who choose to undergo reassignment surgery 
are generally categorized as transsexuals.35 
 
 26. Amanda S. Eno, The Misconception of “Sex” in Title VII: Federal Courts Reevaluate 
Transsexual Employment Discrimination Claims, 43 TULSA L. REV. 765, 769–70 (2008). 
 27. Carey Goldberg, Shunning ‘He’ and ‘She,’ They Fight for Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
1996, at 24. 
 28. Tan, supra note 13, at 582.  Intersexed people are people born with “sexual anatomy that 
mixes male and female characteristics in ways that make it difficult, even for an expert, to label 
them male or female.”  Jamison Green, Introduction to Transgender Issues, in Paisley Currah & 
Shannon Minter, Transgender Equality: A Handbook for Activists and Policymakers, at 5 (Policy 
Inst. Natl. Gay & Lesbian Task Force 2000), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/ 
reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf.  Some intersexed people may have internal reproductive organs 
of the sex opposite from his or her birth sex.  Id. 
 29. See Eno, supra note 26, at 769–70. 
 30. Id. at 771–72. 
 31. Id. at 769–70. 
 32. Id. at 770. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Douglas Mason-Schrock, Transsexuals’ Narrative Construction of the “True Self,” 59 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE), 176, 176, 179 (1996). 
 35. Thomas Kando, Passing and Stigma Management: The Case of the Transsexual, 13 SOC. 
Q. 475, 476 (1972).  Transsexualism is “operationally defined as having de facto undergone the 
surgical sex change.”  Id. at 476. 
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Transgenderism is sometimes diagnosed as a psychiatric condition known 
as gender identity disorder (GID).36  Psychologists explain that a person with 
GID experiences “strong and persistent cross-gender identification and 
persistent discomfort with his or her anatomical sex.”37  This discomfort may 
cause transgenders to experience “depression, anxiety, or other mental health 
issues.”38  For these and other reasons, transgenders choose to transition.39 
One transition option is sex reassignment surgery, which changes the 
transgender’s biological genital sex to the desired sex.40  Sex reassignment is 
an irreversible medical procedure and, as with any type of irreversible 
procedure, doctors often worry the patient may regret his or her decision after 
it has been completed.41  This is especially true with sex reassignment surgery 
because after reassignment, a transgender of either sex is “absolutely incapable 
of procreation.”42  Thus, most surgeons require one or more mental health 
professionals assess the patient before surgery.43 
Before surgery, transgenders are required to “undergo a . . . trial period of 
cross-gender living which includes employment in the desired gender role.”44  
This period is called the “real life experience”45 and also requires transgenders 
 
 36. Eno, supra note 26, at 771–72.  Even though “transgender” is an umbrella term often 
used to describe both people with and without GID, for purposes of this Comment I will use the 
term only as it refers to those with GID.  Thus, this Comment will only address the legal issues 
facing transgenders diagnosed with GID, whether they have undergone sex reassignment surgery 
or not, and it will not address the legal issues of transgenders who do not suffer from GID. 
 37. Amanda Kennedy, Note, Because We Say So: The Unfortunate Denial of Rights to 
Transgender Minors Regarding Transition, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 282 (2008) 
(quoting DAVID SUE, DERALD W. SUE & STANLEY SUE, UNDERSTANDING ABNORMAL 
BEHAVIOR 307 (6th ed. Houghton Mifflin Co. 2000).  Doctor Richard Green, a psychiatrist, has 
testified that a GID diagnosis “is appropriate only if the discomfort has been continuous for at 
least two years, and is not due to another mental disorder, such as schizophrenia.”  Ulane v. E. 
Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1083 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 38. OLIVIA ASHBEE ET AL., TRANS CARE GENDER TRANSITION: GETTING SEX 
REASSIGNMENT SURGERY 10 (2006). 
 39. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 282. 
 40. See Eric Matusewitch, Does Title VII Protect Transsexuals at Work? Federal 
Prohibitions Against Discrimination Are Nonexistent, 214 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 9, 9 (1996).  A 
male-to-female transsexual surgery “‘involves the removal of the external male sexual organs and 
the construction of an artificial vagina by plastic surgery.  It is supplemented by hormone 
treatments that facilitate the change in secondary sex characteristics,’ such as breast 
development.”  Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083 n.4 (quoting Douglas K. Smith, Comment, 
Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 970 n.37 
(1971)). 
 41. ASHBEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7. 
 42. Matusewitch, supra note 40, at 9. 
 43. ASHBEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 7. 
 44. Matusewitch supra note 40, at 9. 
 45. ASHBEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 10. 
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live openly as the desired sex at home and in public.46  Because transgenders 
who are cross-living for the first time will likely encounter harassment, 
discrimination, and possibly violence,47 it is important the transgender 
understands how transition will change his or her life before making an 
irreversible decision. 
While sex reassignment surgery is a popular choice among transgenders 
who wish to transition, it is not the only option.  Alternatively, transgenders 
may choose to undergo hormone therapy,48 or seek breast, chest, and/or facial 
surgery.49  “While the method and extent of transition will differ for everyone, 
psychological well-being is the ultimate goal.”50 
B. Employment Issues Facing Transgenders 
While many employers may never encounter a transgender employee, 
consultants recommend employers prepare for the possibility.51  Employers 
can start by making sure company policies are in compliance with state law 
and city ordinances.52  Then, if an employee “comes out” at the workplace, 
guidelines will be in place to answer important questions such as, “What 
restroom will the employee use?”53 and “What dress code will the employee 
 
 46. Id. at 10–11.  The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association 
(HBIGDA), the leading organization for the study and treatment of GID, has devised standards of 
care for the treatment of patients with GID and recommends transgenders live full-time as the 
desired gender for at least one year prior to surgery.  Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 
205 (D.D.C. 2006).  To be eligible for surgery, physicians believe a real life experience is 
important because even though some transgenders are fully prepared for transition, others have 
unrealistic expectations about reassignment and need more time to think through their decision.  
ASHBEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 10–11. 
 47. ASHBEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 12. 
 48. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 282. 
 49. See ASHBEE ET AL., supra note 38, at 11 (listing different assessment standards for 
alternative sexual reassignment surgeries).  Physicians do not require a “real life experience” 
when choosing one of these alternatives.  Id.  Nevertheless, the HBIGDA standards recommend 
transgenders live full-time as the gender that matches his or her identity for three months, 
understand the effects and risks of surgery, and be competent to make care decisions before 
undergoing breast or chest surgery.  Id. at 5.  On the contrary, the HBIGDA standards have no 
recommendations for transgenders who undergo only face or voice surgery.  Id. 
 50. Kennedy, supra note 37, at 283.  The World Professional Association for Transgender 
Health, Inc., states that “the general goal of psychotherapeutic, endocrine, or surgical therapy for 
persons with [GID] is lasting personal comfort with the gendered self in order to maximize 
overall psychological well-being and self-fulfillment.”  Id. at 282–83. 
 51. Kelly P. Dwyer, An Employee, Hired as a Man, Becomes a Woman. Now What?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2005, at 10-11. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] PREPARING THE WORKPLACE FOR TRANSITION 1335 
follow?”54  Many employers have already recognized the importance of such 
procedures and have instituted antidiscrimination policies even though such 
policies sometimes cause the employer to lose support among other 
employees.55  Gerald Maatman, Jr., an attorney representing employers in 
cases involving transgender employees, has said that implementing 
antidiscrimination policies “creates some vexing problems for the employer,” 
which include showing respect for the transgender employee while 
acknowledging the fears and tensions of other employees.56  Attaining a 
balance may be difficult, yet more than 150 Fortune 500 companies manage to 
do so by including gender identity in their nondiscrimination policies.57 
A human resources official with Intel Corporation, Pferron Doss, explained 
that Intel has not only implemented antidiscrimination policies, but also 
maintains a specific set of guidelines for supporting transgenders as they 
transition in the workplace.58  Doss explains that for the other employees, it is 
“initially a fear of the unknown.”59  Intel, therefore, works not only to support 
the transgender but also his or her co-workers by informing and educating 
them about working with a transitioning transgender.60 
Regrettably, not all companies are as prepared as Intel.  For instance, when 
Carlos (Carla) Enriquez, a transgender and doctor at West Jersey Health 
Systems, decided to treat her GID by transitioning, she was fired.61  
Specifically, when Carlos changed her name to Carla, began “shaving her 
beard, piercing her ears, growing long hair and wearing a ponytail, and, by 
virtue of hormonal therapy, [began] to grow breasts,” Carla’s employer 
instructed her to “‘stop all this and go back to your previous appearance!’”62  
Carla refused and was consequently terminated.63  Fortunately for Carla, a 
 
 54. See Joanna Grossman, Transsexuals, Dress Codes, and the Law: A New Jersey Court 
Decision Embraces a Broad Concept of Sex Discrimination, FINDLAW, July 17, 2001, http://writ. 
news.findlaw.com/grossman/20010717.html. 
 55. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 51, at J1 (finding that Intel has implemented 
antidiscrimination policies). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Keith Ecker, Out in the Office: Employers Grapple with Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender (LGBT) Workplace Issues, INSIDECOUNSEL, May 2008, at 56.  Companies including 
gender identity in their non-discrimination policies include American Airlines, Capital One, Ford 
Motor Company, Microsoft, and Xerox, among others.  BRIAN MOULTON & LIZ SEATON, 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, TRANSGENDER AMERICANS: A HANDBOOK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
17 (2008). 
 58. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 51, at J1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Suzanne Marasco, Redefining Sexual Classification in the Discrimination Sector: 
Seeking to Protect Individuals Who Have Transgender Status, 63 N.J. L.J., June 16, 2008, at 1. 
 62. Grossman, supra note 54. 
 63. Id. 
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New Jersey appellate court decided that New Jersey’s Law Against 
Discrimination protected her from employment discrimination on the basis of 
both disability and gender identity.64 
Unfortunately, for other transgenders like Carla, not all states have laws 
protecting against discrimination based on sexual or gender identity.  Since 
federal law also fails to adequately protect transgenders from employment 
discrimination, many transgenders have no legal recourse when faced with 
discrimination in the workplace.65 
II.  TITLE VII: A LACK OF PROTECTION 
A. Congressional Intent 
Traditionally, Congress’ purpose in enacting antidiscrimination legislation 
has been to neutralize widespread prejudice against people with stigmatizing 
characteristics and eliminate faulty judgments about their capabilities.66  
Whether the category of discrimination is mutable, such as religion or marital 
status, or immutable, such as race or national origin, antidiscrimination laws 
forbid differential treatment.67  Congress’ aim was no different when it enacted 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  When Congress announced, “sex, 
race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, 
or compensation of employees,”68 Congress “intended to attack these 
stereotyped characterizations so that people would be judged by their intrinsic 
worth” rather than by their exterior traits.69  As a result, Title VII requires 
employers to disregard race, sex, religion, and national origin when making 
employment decisions.70  But what exactly does it mean to disregard “sex”? 
Title VII’s legislative history provides little guidance.  Because “sex” was 
added just one day before the House approved Title VII, legislators had neither 
debated its meaning nor held hearings on what constituted “sex” for purposes 
of interpreting the legislation.71  Indeed, when referencing the addition, 
 
 64. Marasco, supra note 61, at 2. 
 65. See infra Part VII. 
 66. Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 10 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
plurality opinion)). 
 69. Id. (quoting Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972)). 
 70. Id.  This is true “except in exceptional and discrete circumstances such as affirmative 
action.”  Id. at 11. 
 71. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Holloway v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted) (“Sex as a basis of 
discrimination was added as a floor amendment one day before the House approved Title VII, 
without prior hearing or debate.”).  “Th[e] sex amendment was the gambit of a congressman 
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legislators spoke only of providing equality in the workplace for women,72 
which left open inevitable questions including how this legislation would 
affect the homosexual, bisexual, and transgender communities.  The United 
States Supreme Court has refused to address the issue, thus leaving federal 
district and appellate courts to grapple with these questions. 
B. Standing 
Courts have been reluctant to grant standing to transgender plaintiffs who 
claim they have been discriminated against “because of sex” under Title VII.73  
As a result, transgender discrimination claims are rarely decided on the merits.  
Although some plaintiffs have presented compelling arguments in favor of 
Title VII protection for transgenders,74 many courts have consistently held 
transgenders cannot claim discrimination “because of . . . sex.”75  So instead of 
eliminating discrimination based on prejudice and faulty perceptions in these 
instances, Title VII, as many courts interpret it, allows discrimination based on 
gender identity. 
III.  FEDERAL CASE LAW 
The first cases brought by transgenders claiming employment 
discrimination under Title VII were almost uniformly dismissed, with courts 
holding that transgenders did not have standing because they were not a 
protected class under Title VII.  Relying heavily on the lack of legislative 
history and Congress’s failed attempts to enact antidiscrimination legislation to 
protect homosexuals, these courts held that the word “sex” in Title VII should 
be given its plain meaning and provided protection for discrimination based on 
biological sex only. 
 
seeking to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights Act.  The ploy failed and sex discrimination was 
abruptly added to the statute’s prohibition against race discrimination.”  Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; 
see Tan, supra note 13, at 584 n.33 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2720 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, 1 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3231 (1968) 
(quoting Rep. Green’s statement that some supporters of adding the “sex” amendment were 
“openly and honestly seeking to kill the entire bill”). 
 72. Tan, supra note 13, at 584 n.34 and accompanying text (noting that addition of Title VII 
“sex” provision was aimed at male–female equality). 
 73. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Oiler v. Winn-
Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Ulane, 742 
F.2d at 1086; Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662; Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 
457 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
 74. See, e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221.  In that case, the transgender plaintiff argued 
discrimination against a person’s identity as a transgender “is directly connected to the sex organs 
she possesses,” and therefore, “discrimination on [that] basis must constitute discrimination 
because of sex.”  Id. 
 75. For a list, see supra note 73. 
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A. Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center76 
The first transgender plaintiff to claim Title VII employment 
discrimination was Charles (Carrie) Voyles.77  When Voyles, a hemodialysis 
technician, informed her employer that she planned to undergo sex 
reassignment surgery, the medical center fired her.78  The medical center 
thereafter admitted they fired Voyles because she intended to change her sex, 
and “such a change might have a potentially adverse effect on both the patients 
receiving treatment at the dialysis unit and on plaintiff’s co-workers.”79  The 
court focused almost exclusively on legislative intent and held transgenderism 
did not fall within the purview of Title VII.80  The court stated, 
[E]ven the most cursory examination of the legislative history surrounding 
passage of Title VII reveals that Congress’ paramount, if not sole, purpose in 
banning employment practices predicated upon an individual’s sex was to 
prohibit conduct which, had the victim been a member of the opposite sex, 
would not have otherwise occurred.  Situations involving trans[genders], 
homosexuals or bi-sexuals were simply not considered, and from this void the 
Court is not permitted to fashion its own judicial interdictions.81 
Thus, the court effectively allowed the medical center to fire Voyles for a 
discriminatory purpose without facing legal repercussion. 
B. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.82 
Two years later, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals 
to decide this issue in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.83  Robert (Ramona) 
Holloway had been working for Arthur Andersen, an accounting firm, for five 
years when she informed her supervisor that she planned to undergo sex 
reassignment surgery.84  Upon receiving the news, Holloway’s supervisor 
suggested that she pursue a new job—one where her transgenderism was 
unknown.85  Five months later, Holloway requested her records be changed to 
 
 76. 403 F. Supp. 456 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
 77. Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 
CAL. L. REV. 561, 567 (2007). 
 78. Voyles, 403 F. Supp. at 456. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 457. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 83. Id. at 661.  The Holloway interpretation of “sex” has since been overruled by Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  See infra Part III.D.  The purpose of citing to 
Holloway and the other cases in this section is to illustrate how “sex” may be interpreted under 
Title VII, even if those interpretations are no longer legally recognized.  Price Waterhouse has 
replaced most of these narrow interpretations.  See id. at 250–53. 
 84. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250–53. 
 85. Id. 
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reflect her new first name, Ramona.86  After Arthur Andersen complied with 
her request, Holloway was terminated.87 
When the case came to the Ninth Circuit, the court noted that the district 
court did not decide Holloway’s case on the merits and posed the issue as 
“whether an employee may be discharged, consistent with Title VII, for 
initiating the process of sex transformation.”88  The court then discussed 
legislative history and determined that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination 
based on “sex” was meant only to “place women on an equal footing with 
men.”89  Citing Congress’ unsuccessful attempts to amend Title VII to include 
protection for discrimination based on “sexual preference,” the court found that 
Congress did not intend to protect transgenders from employment 
discrimination and concluded Holloway failed to state a claim.90 
C. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.91 
Breaking from previous decisions, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc., the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that Title 
VII provided protection for transgenders.92  In 1968, after serving in the United 
States Army in Vietnam, Kenneth (Karen) Ulane93 began flying for Eastern 
Airlines.94  Eleven years later, she was diagnosed with GID.95  Ulane explained 
that “although embodied as a male, from early childhood she felt like a 
female.”96  After her diagnosis Ulane began hormone therapy and eventually 
underwent sex reassignment surgery.97  Eastern Airlines terminated Ulane after 
discovering she was a transgender.98 
Judge Grady, writing for the district court, reasoned “sex is not a cut-and-
dried matter of chromosomes” and that the word “sex,” as used scientifically 
and within the statute, “can be and should be reasonably interpreted to 
include . . . the question of sexual identity and . . . therefore, trans[genders] are 
protected by Title VII.”99  Judge Grady’s opinion focused primarily on 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661. 
 89. Id. at 662. 
 90. Id. at 662–64. 
 91. 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
 92. Id. at 825. 
 93. Associated Press, Karen Ulane, 48, Pilot Who Had Sex Change, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 
1989, at D25 (explaining in her obituary that Karen Ulane was known as “Kenneth” prior to her 
surgery). 
 94. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 95. Id. at 1083. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1084. 
 99. Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825. 
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transgenders’ affliction with sexual identity and refused to recognize Title VII 
protection for cross-dressers or homosexuals because they are not persons with 
“sexual identity problems.”100  Judge Grady explained that the statute “was not 
intended and cannot reasonably be argued to have been intended to cover the 
matter of sexual preference . . . or the matter of sexual gratification from 
wearing the clothes of the opposite sex,” however, it is “an altogether different 
question as to whether the matter of sexual identity is comprehended by the 
word, ‘sex.’”101 
When Eastern Airlines appealed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was 
confronted with the rare opportunity to overturn a district court ruling in favor 
of a transgender plaintiff.102  Without much hesitation, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed.103  Similar to Voyles and Holloway, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Ulane relied on congressional intent, or rather lack thereof, and held that 
transgenders are not protected under Title VII.104  The Seventh Circuit 
examined the last-minute addition of “sex” to the Civil Rights Act and stated, 
“The total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment coupled 
with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption, clearly indicates that 
Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply to 
anything other than the traditional concept of sex.”105 
Giving the words in the statute their plain meaning, the court found that 
“discrimination based on sex” meant to “discriminate against women because 
they are women and against men because they are men.  The words of Title 
VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual identity 
disorder . . . .”106  Nor does Title VII prohibit “discrimination based on an 
individual’s . . . discontent with the sex into which they were born.”107  The 
court stated that while they did not wish to “condone discrimination in any 
form,”108 they could not find a statutory basis for Ulane’s claim.109  Any new 
definition or interpretation “must come from Congress.”110 
 
 100. Id. at 823. 
 101. Id.  In his opinion, Judge Grady notes that prior to his participation in this case he never 
considered a definition of sex beyond male and female.  Id.  But “[a]fter listening to the evidence 
in this case, it [became] clear to [him] that there is no settled definition in the medical community 
as to what we mean by sex.”  Id.  Noting perception, both the individual’s perception of himself 
and society’s perception of the individual, has given rise to Title VII protection in the past, Judge 
Grady argues for a liberal construction of Title VII, one that provides protection to victims of 
group discrimination who perceive themselves differently from non-discriminated racial and 
sexual groups.  See Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 825. 
 102. Turner, supra note 77, at 568–69. 
 103. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. 
 104. Id. at 1085. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084. 
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D. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins111 and the Sex Stereotyping Argument 
The plaintiff in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins was not discriminated against 
for her sexual preferences nor diagnosed with GID,112 yet her claim—and the 
United States Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in her favor—have become 
extremely important and particularly relevant for the homosexual, cross-
dressing, and transgender communities.  After working at Price Waterhouse, a 
nationwide professional accounting firm, for five years, Ann Hopkins was 
nominated for partnership.113  During her time at Price Waterhouse, Hopkins 
was a tremendously successful senior manager who was respected and praised 
for her accomplishments not only by her co-workers, but also her clients.114  
Indeed, partners at Hopkins’ office said she was “‘an outstanding professional’ 
who had a ‘deft touch,’ a ‘strong character, independence, and integrity.’”115  
Yet despite her achievements, some partners opposed Hopkins’ partnership 
and recommended it be held for reconsideration until the following year116 due 
to Hopkins’ aggressive, sometimes abrasive, personality and unsatisfactory 
“inter-personal skills.”117 
After hearing specific partners’ reasons for denying Hopkins’ partnership, 
the court found clear signs that “some of the partners reacted negatively to 
Hopkins’ personality because she was a woman.”118  For instance, one partner 
stated that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” while others described 
her as “macho.”119  Some criticized her vulgar language, one objecting to her 
swearing only “because it’s a lady using foul language,” and another advising 
that she take “a course at charm school.”120  The Court found especially 
disturbing the fact that one partner advised Hopkins that she should “walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry” to improve her chances for partnership 
the next year.121 
To complicate matters, the district court found evidence that “[i]n previous 
years, other female candidates for partnership also had been evaluated in sex-
based terms. . . . [C]andidates were viewed favorably if partners believed they 
 
 109. See Turner, supra note 77, at 569. 
 110. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. 
 111. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 112. Id. at 235. 
 113. Id. at 233. 
 114. See e.g., id. at 234. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 233 (1989). 
 117. Id. at 234–35. 
 118. Id. at 235. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id (quoting a partner at the law firm). 
 121. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 235. 
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maintained their femin[in]ity while becoming effective professional 
managers.”122  The Supreme Court thus affirmed the finding of the lower 
courts, in accordance with strong evidence in the record, that Hopkins was 
discriminated against, at least in part, because “she did not conform to 
stereotypes associated with her sex.”123 
The Court held that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of 
gender.”124  The Court further affirmed, 
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group, for “‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”125 
Whether purposefully or not, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse provided 
transgender plaintiffs with a claim for relief under Title VII.  In the future, 
transgenders would successfully use the sex stereotyping argument to obtain 
standing and have their cases decided on the merits. 
E. Smith v. City of Salem126 
With no federal law prohibiting employment discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or identity, plaintiffs started bringing claims for 
discrimination using the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory.  
Surprisingly, some courts that have heard transgenders’ sex stereotyping 
claims have not only listened to the merits of the case, but have also decided in 
favor of transgender plaintiffs.127  In Smith v. City of Salem, a Sixth Circuit 
case, Jimmie Smith, a transgender diagnosed with GID, was terminated from 
his position as lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department after informing his 
supervisor of his plans to “eventually . . . complete physical transformation 
from male to female”—despite his seven years of service without any negative 
incidents.128 
Analyzing Smith’s case in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in 
Price Waterhouse, the Sixth Circuit found Smith “sufficiently pleaded claims 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Turner, supra note 77, at 575. 
 124. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. 
 125. Id. at 251 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707 n.13 (1978). 
 126. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 127. Turner, supra note 77, at 577.  For examples of such cases, see Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); infra 
note 148 and accompanying text. 
 128. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. 
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of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.”129  The Sixth Circuit found that 
in Price Waterhouse the Supreme Court clearly extended Title VII’s 
discrimination prohibition to victims of “gender” discrimination.130  According 
to the court, Price Waterhouse “eviscerated” the Ulane approach and 
overturned other cases holding that Title VII was limited to discrimination 
based on biological sex.131  The court concluded, 
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women 
because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex 
discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s 
sex.  It follows that employers who discriminate against men because they do 
wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex 
discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s 
sex.132 
F. The Sixth Circuit Affirms Smith in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati133 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed their decision in Smith less than a year later in 
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati.134  In that case, a preoperative male-to-female 
transgender police officer brought a Title VII claim against the City of 
Cincinnati alleging she was demoted because of sex discrimination based on 
her failure to conform to sex stereotypes.135  After Phillip (Philecia) Barnes 
was denied a promotion, she was placed on probation and singled out for a 
special program, which one of Barnes’ reviewing sergeants testified had 
“target[ed] [her] for failure.”136  As part of the program, Barnes’ superiors 
evaluated her performance on a daily basis for over three months.137  In these 
evaluations, Barnes was repeatedly told that she failed to display appropriate 
“command presence,”138 and on one occasion, was told she needed to appear 
more “masculine” and “stop wearing makeup.”139  Due to poor scores on her 
evaluations, Barnes failed the special program and her probation.140 
 
 129. Id. at 572. 
 130. Id. at 573.  “The Supreme Court made clear that in the context of Title VII, 
discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimination: ‘In the context of sex 
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or 
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.’”  Id. at 572 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989)). 
 131. Smith, 378 F.3d at 573. 
 132. Id. at 574. 
 133. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 134. Id. at 747. 
 135. Id. at 733. 
 136. Id. at 735. 
 137. Id. at 734. 
 138. Barnes, 401 F.3d at 735. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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At trial, Barnes’ expert testified that she could not understand why Barnes 
was denied a promotion when her scores on the evaluation tests were “higher 
than at least one other probationary sergeant.”141  The City’s actions further 
appeared discriminatory since Barnes was the only person placed in the special 
program and the only officer to fail probation between 1993 and 2000.142 
To establish a Title VII sex discrimination claim for denial of a promotion, 
Barnes had to demonstrate that she was a member of a protected class.143  
Citing Smith as precedent, the Sixth Circuit again held that transgenders are a 
protected class under the sex stereotyping argument stating, “a label, such as 
‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim . . . .”144 
In response to the City’s argument that Barnes failed to establish a prima 
facie case because she failed to identify a similarly situated employee who was 
not a member of the protected class but received a promotion, the court held 
“Barnes need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving 
more favorable treatment . . . .”145  Instead, Barnes needed only to show that 
the other employee and she were similar in “all of the relevant aspects.”146  
Since Barnes demonstrated that she was the only sergeant to fail probation in 
seven years and another sergeant with lower probationary scores, who was not 
a member of the protected class, passed probation, the court concluded that 
Barnes satisfied her burden.147 
After Smith, Barnes, and several other similar district court opinions,148 it 
appeared that Title VII protection would be extended to protect individuals 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Barnes, 401 F.3d at 736–37. 
 144. Id. at 737 (quoting Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. (citing Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 353 (6th 
Cir.1998)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 
22757935, at *4, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that transgender employee stated an 
actionable claim under Title VII when discriminated against for failing to “act like a man”); 
Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2007 WL 2265630, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 
3, 2007) (stating a transgender plaintiff can state a sex stereotyping claim if the claim is that the 
plaintiff has been discriminated against for failing to appear masculine or feminine enough for the 
employer); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that “under Price 
Waterhouse, ‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences 
between men and women—and gender”); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, 542 
F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (finding plaintiff’s transgenderism was not a bar to her sex 
stereotyping claim); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(remanding the case in light of plaintiff’s potential sex stereotyping claim ); Mitchell v. Axcan 
Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A. 05-243, 2006 WL 456173, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb.17, 2006) (holding 
the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse “clearly stated that Title VII requires that gender be 
irrelevant to employment decisions”); Kastl v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 02-
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who had been discriminated against because they did not conform with gender 
stereotypes despite labels such as “transsexual” or “transgender.”  Yet, a few 
district courts have refused to accept Price Waterhouse as binding precedent. 
G. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Rejects the Sex Stereotyping Argument 
Even though cases like Smith and Barnes tend to suggest otherwise, 
transgenders arguing sex stereotyping have not always been successful.  For 
instance, in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie,149 the court rejected Peter (Donna) Oiler’s sex 
stereotyping argument in favor of a more traditional interpretation of Title 
VII.150  Despite the fact that he had never cross-dressed at work, Oiler was 
fired after informing his supervisor that he was a transgendered cross-
dresser.151  The company president and Oiler’s supervisor explained that they 
fired Oiler because they believed if customers recognized him as a cross-
dresser, they would disapprove of his lifestyle and shop elsewhere.152  Simply 
put, Oiler suffered an adverse employment action because Winn-Dixie thought 
he was a liability to the company.153 
Quoting Ulane extensively, the court in Winn-Dixie followed the Seventh 
Circuit’s line of reasoning and held that Title VII does not outlaw 
discrimination against someone based on his or her sexual identity disorder.154  
Rejecting Oiler’s sex stereotyping argument, the court held that this was not a 
situation where the plaintiff was discharged for failing to conform to a sex 
stereotype.155  Instead, the court found that the “plaintiff was terminated 
because he is a man with a sexual or gender identity disorder . . . .”156 
Although the court appeared to apply the sex stereotyping rule from Price 
Waterhouse when it found “no evidence that plaintiff was discriminated 
against because he was perceived as being insufficiently masculine,”157 the 
court subsequently held Price Waterhouse was inapplicable because Ann 
Hopkins “may not have behaved as the partners thought a woman should have, 
 
1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (“It is well settled that Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination against an individual for 
failure to conform to sex stereotypes.”). 
 149. Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. Sept. 
16, 2002). 
 150. Id. at *3. 
 151. Id. at *1–2.  Oiler is not the typical transgender plaintiff.  Although he has been 
diagnosed with GID, Oiler remains a married heterosexual.  Id. at *1. 
 152. Id. at *2. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *3–4. 
 155. Id. at *5. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *5 n.60. 
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but she never pretended to be a man or adopted a masculine persona.”158  
Where other courts have held differently, the Winn-Dixie court indicated that 
the sex stereotyping argument could never apply to a transgendered 
employee.159 
H. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority and Avoiding the Sex Stereotyping 
Argument 
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority,160 Michael (Krystal) Etsitty, a 
preoperative male-to-female transgender bus operator claimed she was 
terminated both because she was transgendered and because she failed to 
conform to her employer’s expectations of stereotypical male behavior.161  As 
a bus operator for the Utah Transit Authority (UTA), Etsitty drove routes 
requiring her to use public restrooms.162  In preparation for sex reassignment 
surgery, Etsitty began her real-life experience as a female by cross-dressing at 
work, wearing make-up, jewelry, acrylic nails, and using female restrooms 
while on her route.163  After discovering that Etsitty still had male genitalia, the 
UTA terminated her employment citing potential liability arising from Etsitty’s 
restroom usage as their non-discriminatory reason.164 
The court said that it “need not decide whether [a sex stereotyping] claim 
may extend Title VII protection to trans[gender]s who act and appear as a 
member of the opposite sex” because a sex stereotyping claim is available and 
that Etsitty satisfied her prima facie burden.165  Assuming Etsitty established 
her prima facie case allowed the court to shift the burden onto the UTA to 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Etsitty.166  The 
court then accepted the UTA’s proffered reason for terminating Etsitty as 
legitimate and non-discriminatory, namely the UTA’s concern that use of a 
women’s public restroom by a male employee would result in liability.167 
 
 158. Id. at *6. 
 159. Turner, supra note 77, at 586 (“The court . . . seemed to endorse the notion that Price 
Waterhouse’s gender-stereotyping theory could never apply to a transgender employee.”). 
 160. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 161. Id. at 1218. 
 162. Id. at 1219. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1224. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  Even though the court claimed analyzing Etsitty’s sex stereotyping claim was 
unnecessary, it later rejected it noting that “[h]owever far Price Waterhouse reaches, this court 
cannot conclude it requires employers to allow biological males to use women’s restrooms.”  Id.  
The court stated, “Use of a restroom designated for the opposite sex does not constitute a mere 
failure to conform to sex stereotypes.”  Id. 
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Winn-Dixie, Etsitty, and other rejections and avoidances of sex 
stereotyping claims shows that the argument fails to adequately safeguard 
transgenders from employment discrimination.168  With only the Sixth Circuit 
granting transgender plaintiffs standing, and the Supreme Court refusing to 
resolve the split,169 it seems uniform protection is highly unlikely, absent a new 
approach. 
IV.  DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF . . . SEX”: A NEW APPROACH 
The District Court for the District of Columbia recently held in Schroer v. 
Billington170 that the transgender plaintiff stated a claim by alleging that an 
employer refused to hire her solely because of her gender identity, and in doing 
so, discriminated against her “because of . . . sex” in violation of Title VII.171  
Dave (Diane) Schroer “applied for, was offered, and accepted, a position as a 
senior terrorism research analyst” with the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) within the Library of Congress.172  As a twenty-five year veteran of the 
Army who worked with the United States Special Operations Units in 
planning, directing, and executing special operations in the War on Terror, 
Schroer was highly qualified for the position.173  After accepting the offer, 
Schroer informed the CRS she was a transgender and planned to transition 
from male to female.174  Schroer explained that although she did not plan on 
having sex reassignment surgery for at least a year, she did plan to wear 
traditionally feminine clothing at work and go by a feminine name.175  Her 
offer was subsequently rescinded.176 
Schroer filed suit, alleging that CRS’s decision was “based on [a] concern 
she would not be viewed as a credible authority on terrorism because her 
appearance as a female would not conform to members of Congress’ social 
 
 168. See, e.g., Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(holding plaintiff was not discriminated against due to “stereotypic concepts” about her ability to 
perform her job); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Srvs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994) 
(finding the transgender plaintiff was not discriminated against based on her “personal 
appearance”); Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 WL 21525058, at 
*3 (S.D. Ind. June 17, 2003) (rejecting the notion that Price Waterhouse’s sex stereotyping 
argument extends to transgenders). 
 169. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 471 U.S. 1017 (1985) (denying certiorari to Karen Ulane’s 
petition for the writ); City of Cincinnati v. Barnes, 546 U.S. 1003 (2005) (denying certiorari to 
Philecia Barnes’ petition for the writ). 
 170. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 171. Id. at 205. 
 172. Marcia Coyle, Library of Congress Bias Case May Have Key Impact, THE NAT’L L.J., 
Aug. 18, 2008, at 6. 
 173. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 205–06. 
 174. Coyle, supra note 172, at 6. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 206. 
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stereotypes regarding how women should look.”177  Comparing Price 
Waterhouse to Schroer’s claim, the court explained, 
The actionable discrimination in Price Waterhouse proceeded from the opinion 
of the employer that the plaintiff was not sufficiently feminine for her sex.  But 
there is a difference between “macho” women or effeminate men, whether 
trans[gender] or not, and persons such as Schroer whose adoption of a name 
and choice of clothing is part of an intentional presentation of herself as a 
person of a different sex than that of her birth.178 
The court found that the sex stereotyping argument protects women who are 
penalized for acting masculine and men who are admonished for acting 
effeminate, but does not protect transgender men, effeminate or not, or 
transgender women, masculine or not, who present themselves as the opposite 
sex.179  The difference is that transgenders do not wish “to go against the 
gender grain.”180  Rather, the court found transgenders like Schroer embrace 
cultural norms and seek to adopt them, for instance, by adopting a feminine 
name and wearing feminine clothing.181  The court thus found CRS rescinded 
Schroer’s offer not because she failed to conform to sex stereotypes, but, more 
simply, because her gender identity did not match “her anatomical sex.”182 
The court then suggested that the district court’s decision in Ulane, 
overturned by the Seventh Circuit, served as a better justification for Title VII 
protection for transgenders: “[I]t may be time to revisit Judge Grady’s 
conclusion in Ulane I that discrimination against trans[genders] because they 
are trans[genders] is ‘literally’ discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”183  In 
other words, the Schroer court advocated for a per se rule providing 
employment discrimination protection to transgenders under Title VII.  This 
straightforward approach would provide a clear way to manage “the factual 
complexities that underlie . . . real variations in how the different components 
of biological sexuality—chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal, and neurological—
interact with each other, and . . . with social, psychological, and legal 
conceptions of gender.”184  After all, “scientific observation may well 
confirm . . . that ‘sex is not a cut-and-dried matter of chromosomes.’”185  But 
the court stopped short, explaining that a decision to reinterpret Title VII 
 
 177. Ellen Martin, Evolving Theories of Sex, Race, and Color Discrimination Under Title VII, 
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 178. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 211. 
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 183. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212. 
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cannot be made at the pleading stage.186  Instead, the court simply denied the 
Library of Congress’ motion to dismiss,187 giving Schroer hope that it might 
later expand the definition of discrimination “because of . . . sex” under Title 
VII to include discrimination against transgenders solely because they are 
transgendered. 
While the court in Schroer indicated Title VII’s discrimination prohibition 
should apply to transgenders, it is doubtful other courts will do the same.  
Given Title VII’s lack of legislative history and Congress’ failed attempts to 
pass sexual orientation and gender identity employment discrimination 
legislation,188 courts have little reason to deviate from precedent.  Thus, even 
though Schroer offers some hope, a congressional measure is likely the best 
option for ensuring transgender individuals protection from discrimination. 
V.  THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT 
A. Congressional Initiatives 
Since 1975, Congress has considered amending Title VII to include a ban 
on employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.189  After several 
failed attempts, gay advocates abandoned the fight for an amendment and 
proposed an entirely different piece of legislation, the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA).190  The first version of the ENDA, House 
Resolution 2015, included protection for gays, lesbians, and transgenders by 
barring employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity.191  Specifically, the Act prohibited private employers with fifteen or 
more employees; federal, state and local governments; labor unions; and 
employment agencies from: 
 Firing, refusing to hire, or taking any other action that would 
harm a person’s status as an employee based on that person’s 
sexual orientation or gender identity, whether perceived or 
actual. 
 Discriminating against an employee as a result of the sexual 
orientation or gender identity of someone with whom the 
employee associates. 
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 Discriminating against an individual because that person has 
opposed an unlawful employment practice or one the individual 
reasonably believed was an unlawful employment practice. 
 Discriminating against an employee who participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under the 
ENDA.192 
House Resolution 2015 allowed employers to impose reasonable dress 
codes, but it contained special consideration for transgenders undergoing 
transition procedures.193  Additionally, the Act gave the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement power and permitted 
transgenders, whose complaints could not be resolved by the EEOC, to file suit 
in federal court for damages, including attorneys’ fees.194  This version of the 
ENDA was introduced in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003, but failed in the 
House on each occasion.195 
After a survey of House members revealed that an amended ENDA 
protecting sexual orientation but not gender identity would likely pass, interest 
groups supporting the bill shifted gears.196  Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Cal.) and 
other Democrats, including Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.), an openly 
gay congressman, removed language that banned discrimination based on 
gender identity.197  Thus, the newer version of the ENDA, House Resolution 
3685, prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation198 but left 
transgenders vulnerable.199  This decision infuriated the National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force and other lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights 
organizations200 who consequently withdrew their support for the sexual 
orientation-only ENDA.201  Even without the support of the gay and 
transgender communities, the House Education and Labor Committee 
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approved the sexual orientation-only bill on October 18, 2007.202  On 
November 7, 2007, the House of Representatives passed the sexual orientation-
only version of the ENDA by a vote of 235–184.203  While many Democrats 
were excited about finally passing a bill protecting sexual orientation, others 
were disappointed at the omission of protection for transgenders.204 
Although the ENDA was never introduced in the Senate during the 110th 
session, some senators indicated that they would support the sexual 
orientation-only version.205  “Senator Susan Collins, Republican of Maine, said 
that she would be the lead co-sponsor of the Senate bill.”206  In her statement, 
Senator Collins said “the House vote ‘provides important momentum’ and that 
‘there is growing support in the Senate for strengthening federal laws to protect 
American workers from discrimination based on sexual orientation.’”207  The 
late Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) also expressed support.208  On 
November 8, 2007, one day after the House passed the sexual orientation-only 
ENDA, Kennedy stated that he hoped the Senate would pass the bill in 2008.209  
Even though the proposed bill lacked protection for transgenders, Kennedy’s 
spokesperson said he would support it as the only realistic chance of passing 
the ENDA during Congress’ 2007–08 session.210 
Despite visible signs of support, some members of the gay, bisexual, 
lesbian, and transgender communities doubted the Senate’s commitment to 
enacting the ENDA quickly.211  After all, political observers predicted 
Republican senators opposing the ENDA would filibuster the legislation,212 
and the White House confirmed that President Bush would veto any version of 
the ENDA—whether transgender-inclusive or not—that reached the oval 
office.213  These developments prompted the United ENDA Coalition, an 
alliance of gay and transgender organizations led by the National Gay and 
Lesbian Task Force, to question why the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and 
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congressional Democrats were pushing to pass the ENDA in 2007–08.214  The 
United ENDA Coalition advocated, instead, for postponing a vote until 2009—
when the coalition believed Congress would more likely pass a transgender-
inclusive ENDA, and a newly-elected Democratic president would more likely 
sign the bill into law.215 
In the end, the Congressional session lapsed before the Senate voted on 
H.R. 3685,216 leaving the ENDA’s fate in the hands of the 111th Congress and 
President Obama.  Mara Keisling, Executive Director of the National Center 
for Transgender Equality, stated she has “no doubt” a transgender-inclusive 
ENDA will be passed during Congress’ 111th session.217  Even though she 
does not expect the ENDA to be first on Congress’ agenda, Keisling stated she 
is confident there will be sufficient votes to pass the ENDA this time 
around.218  In an interview before the election, Representative Barney Frank 
(D-Mass.) agreed.  Frank stated, “If [the House] can pick up 15 Democratic 
seats, then I think we are in a good position to pass a transgender-inclusive 
ENDA.”219 
If Representative Frank is correct, Democrats should have no problem 
passing the ENDA during Congress’ 111th session.  For the first time since 
1994 Democrats control both houses of Congress.220  President Obama’s 
Democratic administration is committed to passing the ENDA, too.  In fact, as 
part of his own civil rights agenda, the President promised to work to pass a 
transgender-inclusive ENDA because he “believes that our anti-discrimination 
employment laws should be expanded to include sexual orientation and gender 
identity.”221  To prove his devotion to the issue, President Obama pledged to 
ban discrimination based on gender identity when hiring his own 
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administration.222  Thus, even though a transgender-inclusive ENDA failed to 
muster enough votes on six previous occasions,223 it seems that if the seventh 
vote takes place during the 111th congressional session, there is a strong 
possibility that a different outcome would result. 
B. Effects of the ENDA 
If the ENDA becomes law, transgender employees would have greater 
opportunity to assert their rights in the workplace.  Jurisdictions and 
corporations that ban gender identity discrimination have already experienced 
this phenomenon.224  Lee Schreter, a shareholder in Littler Mendelson, 
explains, 
In the past, the issue often wouldn’t come up because the employee who was 
getting ready to transition would move to avoid the difficult problems of 
having to come to terms with people who knew them before[.] . . .  Now with 
all the changes in the law you can expect that more and more people will come 
forward and ask for their employer’s assistance.225 
The ENDA would force employers to consider how they will handle  
issues that accompany transgenders in the workplace.  Fortunately, several 
companies that currently employ transgenders are already managing the 
task.226  These companies can serve as examples for how to deal with 
supporting employees who remain at the workplace during their period of 
transition. 
1. Amending Non-Discrimination Policies 
If the ENDA is enacted, the first step towards compliance for many 
businesses will likely be amending non-discrimination policies to ban 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Many 
companies have already done just that.  In fact, in the last five years the 
number of Fortune 500 companies that include gender identity in their Equal 
Employment Opportunity (EEO) policies rose from twenty-seven to more than 
150.227  According to Michael Cohen, a partner in WolfBlock’s employment 
services group, 
Employers are becoming more proactive in this area for two reasons . . . .  
First, they don’t want to get sued for discrimination.  Second, they realize that 
 
 222. Bill Leonard, Obama Transition Team’s EEO Policy Protects Gender Identity, H.R. 
MAG., Jan. 2009, at 18. 
 223. Tan, supra note 13, at 604. 
 224. Mary Swanton, Identity Issues: Rapidly Changing Legal Landscape Supports 
Transgendered Employees’ Rights, INSIDECOUNSEL, Oct. 2007, at 30, 32–33. 
 225. Id. at 30. 
 226. MOULTON & SEATON, supra note 57, at 17. 
 227. Ecker, supra note 57, at 56. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1354 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1329 
the fairness issue is an important one.  Why would you want someone treated 
differently based on [his or her] sexual orientation or transgender status?  It 
just doesn’t make sense.228 
Moreover, companies that have amended their policies claim it makes good 
business sense by encouraging a collaborative environment, enhancing internal 
morale, and providing a competitive advantage.229  Such a change may give 
rise to more benefits than employers would expect. 
Scott Turner, managing partner at Nixon Peabody, claims his company 
encourages diversity in the workplace not only because it is the right thing to 
do, but also because it lends itself to a more cooperative, collaborative, and 
welcoming environment both internally and among clients.230  When 
employers vow to make hiring decisions based on merit and ability rather than 
on other irrelevant factors, morale in the workplace is higher.231  This, in turn, 
can also result in higher productivity for the employer.232  Companies that 
amend their non-discrimination policies tend to get better work out of their 
gay, bisexual, lesbian, and transgender employees—likely because those 
employees feel supported, accepted, and appreciated by their employers.233 
Companies with more inclusive nondiscrimination policies have also found 
that such changes have “improve[d] recruitment and retention of not just 
transgender employees, but also ‘other fair-minded employees.’”234  
“Protections based on gender identity send a strong message to transgender 
job-seekers.”235  Thus, employers who provide those protections “will have a 
larger pool of candidates to select from because no one is self-selecting himself 
out of the process or being eliminated based on factors that have no bearing on 
job performance.”236  Moreover, employers that actively support transgenders 
in the workplace have a lasting impact on the transgender employee’s 
performance, attitude, and commitment to that employer.237  “According to a 
1997 study by the Families & Work Institute, ‘the quality of the workers’ jobs 
and the supportiveness of their workplaces are the most powerful predictors of 
productivity, job satisfaction, commitment to their employers and 
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retention.’”238  Brad Salavich, former program manager for the gay, bisexual, 
lesbian, and transgender workforce diversity at IBM, says that gender identity 
inclusive policies are used not only to recruit transgenders, but also as a signal 
to other protected classes of individuals, such as women and minorities, that 
they will be accepted too.239 
1. Establishing Bathroom and Locker Room Protocol 
Not all issues are as easy to solve as amending non-discrimination policies.  
Not surprisingly, the most controversial issue for employers with a 
transitioning employee involves the use of bathroom facilities.  Often this is 
not only an issue for the transitioning employee, but also for his or her co-
workers.240  There are two generally accepted approaches to solving this 
dilemma.241  The first involves offering a unisex or third restroom.242  This 
helps balance the interests of the transitioning employee with the concerns of 
any uncomfortable co-workers.243  “The second tactic, the one experts feel is 
most equitable, is to allow the transitioning employee to use the restroom that 
matches [his or her] gender presentation.”244  Co-workers who are 
uncomfortable using the same restroom as the transgender should then be 
given the option of using an alternate restroom.245 
Locker rooms in the workplace present a similar challenge.  The HRC 
recommends that employers install stalls or curtains to offer privacy in 
changing and shower areas.246  But if creating a private area is not possible, 
employers are encouraged to organize a changing and showering schedule in 
the public area, or find a nearby private area for transgenders to use.247  
Obviously, no single solution will work for every employer; but if companies 
can provide accommodations that maintain the dignity of all employees in a 
respectful manner, they will likely avoid violating the ENDA. 
More often than not, the only reason bathroom and locker room use 
presents an issue is because co-workers are not informed about transgender 
issues.  Stephanie Marnin, an associate in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender practice group at a plaintiff’s firm explains, “Often it’s about 
people being afraid and not understanding that men who are going to assault 
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women in bathrooms are not going to dress as a woman.”248  If employers and 
co-workers are educated about the transitioning process, they will realize that 
this is not a legitimate concern.249  Employers can, and often do, handle this 
issue by informing and educating their employees. 
2. Informing and Educating Other Employees 
Learning that a fellow co-worker who employees thought was a man is 
actually a woman can be disruptive in the workplace if it is not handled 
carefully.250  According to Lee Schreter, there is usually a thirty to sixty day 
period where everyone is talking about the transition, “[b]ut if it is handled 
properly, it becomes a non-issue.”251  Involving senior management is one way 
that companies can send a strong and clear message of support, while setting 
examples for other employees.252  Since managers are watched and mimicked 
by employees, companies seeking to minimize the likelihood of harassment in 
the workplace should make sure they are careful to treat the transitioning 
employee with respect, especially when addressing the employee as he or she 
wishes to be addressed.  This includes using the employee’s new name and the 
appropriate pronoun.253 
According to Christine Duffy, a senior staff attorney at the Pro Bono 
Partnership and a male-to-female transgender, “Nothing succeeds unless there 
is a corporate buy-in.  The head of an organization needs to make it clear they 
are behind [the transgender employee] and they won’t tolerate harassment or 
discrimination.”254  Duffy recommends the employer and transgender 
employee work together to determine how much information the transgender 
feels comfortable sharing with his or her co-workers.255  That way, the 
employer can create a communication plan before rumors begin to spread.256  
Some employers will opt to give the transgender employee time off from work 
while they explain the situation to the other employees and educate them on 
gender identity issues.257  This allows time for the information to sink in and 
the shock to wear off. 
After employees are informed of the transition, employers will generally 
follow up with antidiscrimination and harassment training.  Employers do so 
by either incorporating gender identity into a larger diversity training program, 
 
 248. Swanton, supra note 224, at 35. 
 249. Ecker, supra note 57, at 58. 
 250. Swanton, supra note 224, at 35. 
 251. Id. 
 252. TRANSGENDER INCLUSION, supra note 234, at 26. 
 253. Swanton, supra note 224, at 35. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] PREPARING THE WORKPLACE FOR TRANSITION 1357 
or by facilitating a full-fledged educational program on gender identity issues 
alone.258  At a minimum, employers provide guidance regarding appropriate 
workplace behavior and the consequences for failing to comply with non-
discrimination policies.259 
Without a doubt, if the ENDA is passed, employers will be forced to 
consider these and other issues concerning transgenders in the workplace.  
Although a few accommodations would likely be necessary, the ENDA would 
largely require nothing more than equal treatment for transgenders.  If 
employers abide by the ENDA and handle transgender employees’ transitions 
with understanding and respect, transgenders will no longer suffer silently 
from unemployment, underemployment, harassment, and other forms of 
discrimination. 
VI.  PROPOSAL 
A. Protection Is Needed 
According to the National Center for Transgender Equality “transgender 
people face disproportionate amounts of discrimination in all areas of life, 
[but] especially in employment.”260  As a result, transgenders experience not 
only unemployment, but also underemployment.261  In fact, “Within the 
transgender community, it is not uncommon to find people dramatically 
underemployed regardless of their experience or background.”262  Even highly 
trained and proficient transgender employees are often unable to secure full-
time employment.263  They are instead forced to take on one or more part-time 
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positions and forego healthcare and other benefits.264  If transgenders are lucky 
enough to maintain full-time employment during and after transition, they will 
almost certainly experience blatant discrimination from fellow employees who 
knew them before transition and refuse to accept their new gender identity.265 
Empirical studies confirm that workplace discrimination is a pervasive 
problem for the transgender community.  For instance, six studies regarding 
employment discrimination against gays, bisexuals, lesbians, and transgenders 
that were conducted between 1996 and 2006 revealed that twenty to fifty-seven 
percent of transgender participants encountered employment discrimination 
during that time period, “including being fired, denied a promotion, or 
harassed.”266  Another study, conducted in 2007, found that as many as 68% of 
gays, bisexuals, lesbians, and transgenders experience employment 
discrimination; but only 15%–57% percent of transgenders reported that 
discrimination to their employers.267  It can thus be concluded that many 
transgenders feel pressure to hide their true gender identities in order to 
maintain their livelihoods.268 
B. The Sex Stereotyping Argument Fails to Adequately Protect Transgenders 
Current law does not provide transgenders sufficient protection from 
employment discrimination.  Under federal law and the law in more than thirty 
states, employers can legally fire, refuse to hire, and refuse to promote 
transgender employees for discriminatory purposes.269  Transgender plaintiffs 
who suffer adverse employment actions in states without protection are 
virtually left without legal recourse.  While they may proceed with a sex 
stereotyping argument, the likelihood of success on the merits remains slim. 
Contrary to the views of many commentators,270 previous success for 
transgender sex stereotyping claims in the Sixth Circuit is unlikely to benefit 
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many transgenders in Title VII cases.  While transgender plaintiffs who file 
cases in the Sixth Circuit will likely obtain standing, plaintiffs in the other 
circuits will never have their cases decided on the merits.  With courts like 
Winn-Dixie and Etsitty refusing to extend sex stereotyping protection to 
transgenders in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and courts like Schroer 
denying its application to transgenders in the District of Columbia, the sex 
stereotyping argument has had little effect outside the Sixth Circuit. 
Courts refusing to extend the holding in Price Waterhouse to transgenders 
have taken two approaches in denying protection from sex stereotyping to 
transgenders.  First, courts have held that the sex stereotyping argument is 
inapplicable to transgenders because, in passing the Civil Rights Act, Congress 
intended to prohibit discrimination against women, not transgenders.271  These 
courts correctly explain that the sex amendment’s sparse legislative history 
indicates that Congress never considered nor intended to protect transgenders 
from employment discrimination.272  Indeed, Representative Smith, the 
Congressman who proposed the addition of “sex” to the 1964 legislation, 
explained that he did so “to prevent discrimination against another minority 
group, the women,” and “to correct the present ‘imbalance’ which exists 
between males and females in the United States.”273  To be sure, Congress 
never discussed any connection between the discrimination prohibition and 
transgenders’ civil rights.  Second, courts have held that the sex stereotyping 
argument is inapplicable to transgenders because transgenders are categorically 
different from effeminate men or masculine women.274  While effeminate men 
and masculine women are discriminated against for failing to conform to 
gender stereotypes, these courts argue transgenders are discriminated against 
because their gender identity does not match their anatomical sex.275 
As long as a circuit split remains, transgenders will be denied uniform 
treatment under the law.  Courts will continue using one or both of the 
approaches outlined above to reject transgenders’ sex stereotyping claims.  
Absent clear guidance from the Supreme Court, a judicial solution will not 
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likely bring an end to the pervasive problem of employment discrimination 
against transgenders.  Because several courts interpreting Title VII have 
pointed to the lack of legislative history surrounding the addition of “sex” as an 
indication that Congress did not intend to protect transgenders with the 1964 
legislation,276 a transgender-inclusive ENDA—with sufficient congressional 
history to explain whom Congress aims to protect—is necessary to fully 
protect transgenders from employment discrimination.  This legislation would 
finally provide transgenders with standing to sue and the opportunity to have 
their cases decided on the merits. 
C. Protection Against Employment Discrimination Based on Gender Identity 
To best protect transgenders from employment discrimination, Congress 
must pass, and the President must sign into law, a transgender-inclusive 
ENDA.  Only a transgender-inclusive ENDA, similar to House Resolution 
2015, will adequately protect transgenders from employment discrimination.  
This legislation would effectively address discrimination in the workplace by 
making it illegal to fire, refuse to hire, or refuse to promote an employee 
simply based on his or her gender identity. 
Like the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Americans 
with Disability Act of 1990,277 the ENDA’s legislative history should begin 
with an examination of the overall purpose of employment antidiscrimination 
law.  As those acts acknowledge, the general goal of antidiscrimination 
legislation is to promote employment decisions based on individual ability 
rather than stereotypic assumptions or membership in a disfavored group.278  
This introduction will serve as a reminder that the ENDA is modeled after 
existing federal civil rights laws and is meant to ensure that the gay, bisexual, 
lesbian, and transgender communities receive the same treatment under the law 
as other protected classes. 
The ENDA should also include an accurate description of whom Congress 
intends to protect.  When antidiscrimination legislation fails to unambiguously 
define the protected class, standing problems arise, as evidenced by various 
courts’ different interpretations of “sex” in Title VII.  To ensure uniform 
interpretation of the ENDA, terms such as gender identity, sexual orientation, 
and gender expression should be explicitly defined.  Explicit definitions 
accompanied by a clear discrimination prohibition will best serve all interested 
parties, including employers, transgendered employees, and the courts.  First, 
specific definitions and unambiguous antidiscrimination guidelines would 
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provide clear guidance to employers who would then know their 
responsibilities under the law and could formulate policies and monitor their 
practices in accordance with the legislative mandate.  Second, this combination 
would allow transgender employees to understand their rights and initiate 
lawsuits when those rights are infringed.  Finally, this clearly constructed 
legislation would equip courts with a usable framework to analyze and decide 
cases of employment discrimination under the ENDA. 
A transgender-inclusive ENDA would also cure the problems associated 
with interpreting Title VII’s sex provision and the circuit split on the sex 
stereotyping argument.  As of now, transgenders who live inside the Sixth 
Circuit have the benefit of the sex stereotyping argument, while those outside 
the Sixth Circuit are denied protection.  Realistically, this difference creates “a 
conflict in enforcement of Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions.”279  
Employers with operations in and outside of the Sixth Circuit are forced to 
either use different employment guidelines or alter employment policies 
regarding transgenders in all locations.280  For example, if a company has 
offices in Cincinnati and Chicago, and each office fires a transgender, one 
office may face liability for sex stereotyping, while the other will not.  Even 
though companies such as these can reduce the possibility of any liability by 
adopting uniform antidiscrimination policies, employers should not be forced 
to choose between competing interpretations of Title VII.  Thus, the best 
solution would be to create a uniform law, which would in turn lead to uniform 
business practices. 
D. The Time Is Ripe 
Common sense dictates that discrimination should not be legal.  No person 
should be denied equal opportunity in employment because of membership in a 
minority group.  Yet, employers in over thirty states are currently allowed to 
fire, refuse to hire, and refuse to promote employees based on their gender 
identities.281  It is time our federal government recognize a cause of action for 
blatant and unsubstantiated prejudice against transgenders in the workplace.  
Current law bars employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, age, and disability.282  In the words of ENDA 
supporter, Representative Betty McCollum, “It is time to extend these 
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protections to all Americans.”283  It is time federal law recognizes a cause of 
action for employment discrimination against transgenders. 
The growing number of corporations, cities, and states that have amended 
their antidiscrimination policies to include protection for transgenders provides 
evidence that people in America acknowledge the transgender community 
deserves adequate safeguards against employment discrimination.  In fact, 
since the introduction of the ENDA in the House of Representatives, over 230 
major corporations in the United States have amended their non-discrimination 
policies to include protection for homosexuals and transgenders.284  In 
addition, thirteen states, the District of Columbia, and ninety-one cities and 
counties now explicitly forbid discrimination against transgenders in the 
employment setting.285 
Recent polls confirm that the American people recognize the importance of 
adequately safeguarding transgenders from employment discrimination.  
According to the HRC, “polling shows that most Americans [not only] 
understand what the term transgender means” but also “support fundamental 
fairness for transgender people, including protection from discrimination on 
the job.”286  “In July 2002, HRC commissioned the first national poll on 
attitudes of American voters toward transgender people and public policy 
issues”:287 
On public policy issues, an overwhelming majority of people felt that our 
nation’s laws should protect transgender people.  Sixty-one percent of those 
polled believed that we needed laws to protect transgender people from job 
discrimination, a number confirmed in a September 2004 poll, when 65 
percent of respondents thought it should definitely be illegal to fire and refuse 
employment to someone just because they’re transgender and 13 percent said it 
probably should be illegal.288 
Controlling the House, 257–178,289 the Senate, 58–40,290 and the 
Presidency, Democrats have the best chance at passing the ENDA in more than 
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a decade.  Understandably, ENDA advocates, both within and outside 
Congress, are extremely hopeful the ENDA will be passed during Congress’s 
111th session.  With support from President Obama, whose platform for the 
2008 election included transgender employment rights, protection for 
transgenders against employment discrimination is on the horizon.  If ENDA 
supporters in Congress are able get the bill on his desk, there is no question 
President Obama will sign it into law. 
CONCLUSION 
Unlike individuals who experience discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, sex, age, and disability, individuals who 
experience discrimination on the basis of gender identity have little to no legal 
recourse to redress such discrimination.  Transgenders deserve protection from 
employment discrimination, just as other classes have deserved protection, 
simply because it is unjust to fire, refuse to hire, or refuse to promote someone 
based on his or her immutable gender identity. 
By enacting a transgender-inclusive Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 
Congress would be protecting yet another minority group from unwarranted 
discrimination in the workplace.  A transgender-inclusive ENDA is the best 
option for protection—better than relying on the courts to arrive at a judicial 
resolution—because the ENDA would mandate uniform protection across the 
country.  Furthermore, the ENDA, if passed, would provide the gay, bisexual, 
lesbian, and transgender communities with a sense of security while sending a 
clear message to employers that they can no longer discriminate on the basis of 
on sexual orientation, gender expression, or gender identity. 
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